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Decision Making in Entrepreneurial Finance: A Behavioral Perspective1 
 
Rassoul Yazdipour, Ph.D. 
California State University, Fresno 
 
Abstract  Central questions in entrepreneurship and entrepreneurial finance are briefly discussed 
and case is made for the need for applying the behavioral finance theories and models to better 
understand the decision making dynamics that is involved at each  stage of the entrepreneurial 
process. By dissecting a venture’s total risk into a “Resident Risk” component and a “Behavioral 
Risk” component, attempt is made in this writing to introduce a preliminary risk model for 
evaluating key entrepreneurial decisions like the decision to launch and fund a new venture . 
Although the focus here is on individual decision making under highly uncertain entrepreneurial 
environments, but the suggested risk framework and the related discussions can be extended to 
decision making processes in all other uncertain environment. 
Introduction 
Generally speaking, the following three functions make up the whole entrepreneurial 
process. 
1. Entry/Seed Funding Decisions, 
2. Financing/Investment Decisions, and 
3. Growth/Exit Decisions. 
Additionally, regardless of one’s association with either of the two finance paradigms, traditional 
finance or behavioral finance, uncertainty and return remain to be the determining factors in all 
the three decision problems listed in above2. 
Moreover, although the traditional finance and economic theories have had some successes 
in providing some solutions to the last two problems, but they have had little to say on how 
entrepreneurs decide to start a new venture and how investors select such ventures for investment 
purposes3. By design, the dominant traditional theory, the Agency Theory, can not make any 
predictions regarding firm entry or exit issues.  Furthermore, such paucity of research on the 
                                                           
1
 A version of this article will appear in Rassoul Yazdipour (ed). 2010. Advances in Entrepreneurial Finance: With Applications from Behavioral 
Finance. New York. Springer. 
2
 In this article, and especially where both traditional and behavioral finance paradigms are discussed, we intentionally use the terms risk and 
uncertainty interchangeably. As will be seen soon, some leading scholars have shifted the whole notion and source of risk and uncertainty away 
from evidence-based risk, as defined by statistical tools, to perception-based uncertainty. 
3
 Two points should be mentioned in here: 
a. I use the word “some” because as will be seen in this writing, traditional finance models such as Agency Theory continue to have their 
own shortcomings in explaining and predicting behavior. For details see Bitler, et, al, 2009 and Kaplan and Kaplan and Stromberg, 
200; and 
b. On related research we have to mention Camerer and Lovallo’s work (1999) where they use overconfidence to explain failure. 
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subject should not be surprising at all because in the standard finance and economic theory, 
problems have to be definable in mathematical terms to be considered for any type of analysis 
and application.  The rational construct assumes that economic agents- investors, managers of all 
kind, and entrepreneurs- are “capable of understanding vastly complex puzzles and conduct 
endless instantaneous optimizations”4.  Also the standard finance theory has built its whole 
foundation after a human brain that in H.A. Simon’s words “… serves, perhaps, as a model of 
the mind of God, but certainly not as a model of the mind of man”5. Therefore, to the traditional 
financial economists, uncertainty – a mainly perceptual and personal phenomenon – does not 
fall in such a category and therefore cannot be operationalized in any “meaningful” way.  
 
The behavioral finance approach is important because the traditional finance has remained silent 
on the first issue, and the Agency Theory (financial contracting), which is effectively the only 
theory that is applicable to issues in entrepreneurial finance, has produced mixed empirical 
results6. 
 
On the other hand, over the past 30 years or so psychologists, and more recently 
neuroscientists, have helped us to better understand the human decision making processes; and 
more specifically, how we as individuals perceive risk and uncertainty and how we take the 
required actions at the judgment time7. Scientific breakthroughs in those fields have also given 
rise to the new subfield of behavioral finance8. It is through such behavioral lenses that we 
believe attempts should be made to address the three central questions listed in above. Our main 
focus in this article involves the application of behavioral finance and economic theories to the 
least explored of such three decisions; i.e., the Entry/Seed Funding decisions. Given we first 
need to communicate with each other in this rather unfamiliar territory, attempts are made in this 
writing to introduce some new concepts – which include “Perception Asymmetry”, “Resident 
Risk”, and a behavioral risk model – that as complements to the existing concepts and tools 
could be used in any discussion on decision making under risk and uncertainty.  
Part 2 provides a brief background on the decision problems that entrepreneurs and their 
financial backers, venture capitalists or VCs, face in the course of their business. Part 3 discusses 
some new concepts along with an attempt to provide a preliminary behavioral risk model; 
believing that if we better understand the uncertainties that are involved in and around the 
problems, we will have a better chance of providing more effective solutions to them. Part 4 
summarizes the article and provides some suggestions for future research. 
 
 
                                                           
4
 James Montier, 2007, p. xiii 
5
 H. A Simon, page 34, 1982 
6
 See for example Bitler, et al, 2009 
7
 The most authoritative work advanced in this regard is Kahneman and Tversky’s Prospect Theory which is presented as an alternative to the 
Expected Utility theory and is outlined in this section and the Apx . Another equally significant work is Slovic, et al’s (2002) and Finucane, et al, 
(2000) Affect Heuristic which is also outlined in this section and the Apx.  
8
 For a comprehensive review of the key issues in Behavioral Finance, see Richard H. Thaler’s Advances in Behavioral Finance, Volumes I and 
II, 1993 and 2005.  
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2. The Entry/Seed Funding Decisions: Problems and Existing Solutions 
Central Questions in a Launch Decision 
 
As said in above, our main focus in here is on the application of behavioral finance and 
economic theories to entry/seed funding decisions; jointly defined as launch decisions. Such 
decisions involve two separate but related decisions by both an entrepreneur and a VC. The 
reason for discussing and analyzing the two decisions together is a practical necessity. That is, 
the decision to enter a business by an entrepreneur alone does not mean much; unless, she can 
convince a VC to fund her startup. With this in mind, there are two central questions that both 
entrepreneurs and VCs face in a launch decision. 
a. What are the decision processes for entrepreneurs in a launch decision, and what 
are the decision criteria in that regard? 
b. What are the decision processes for venture capitalists in investing in a launch, 
and what are the decision criteria in that regard? 
Venture Capital Markets 
In free enterprise systems, the role of efficient capital markets is to facilitate the flow of funds 
between the suppliers and the demanders of capital. Well functioning capital markets also insure 
that funds are raised and invested at competitive and reasonable rates. Operational transparency 
is among the most important requirements for the smooth working of such markets. Efficient 
market mechanisms certainly support innovation, job creation, economic development, and 
business growth. Inefficient capital markets will have the opposite effects. In the U.S. and other 
free market economies, transparent and public capital markets which serve large corporations 
have played such a role with unprecedented success in history. 
However, markets for venture capital are certainly not among the well-functioning capital 
markets. This is true even in the U.S., the birthplace of venture capital. The opaqueness of these 
markets is the main reason behind their operational inefficiency.   Naturally, such inefficiency 
translates into increased levels of risk and uncertainty, and consequently increased costs of doing 
business for small and entrepreneurial companies which such markets serve. 
Traditional Finance and Economics’ Response to Launch Decisions 
To resolve the problems that arise in the opaque venture capital markets that we just described, 
traditional finance theory has offered a relatively large body of literature and theories that are 
based on the classical Principal-Agent and Information Asymmetry theories. Under one version 
of the Information Asymmetry (IA) for example, the opaqueness of the IPO markets is addressed 
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and a solution like Signaling Theory is provided. Other IA problems addressed range from 
corporate debt financing to dividend policy and corporate takeovers9. Under Principal-Agent, or 
Agency Theory (AT), the presumed conflict of interest between owner-managers and investors is 
addressed10  (this is also called “interest asymmetry”) and “optimum” financial contracts are 
offered to compensate for the assumed conflicts of interest and other additional risks and 
uncertainties 11.   
However, even with so much work done in the area of financial contracting, a recent study 
(Bitler, et al, 2009) states, “an extensive theoretical literature examines the principal-agent 
problem, …. yet, evidence supporting theory’s predictions is mixed and weak.” Besides,  
Treating entrepreneurs as agents and venture capitalists as principals, as it is the case in AT, is a 
questionable start; because by definition entrepreneurs are the opposite of agents who are good at 
taking orders. Entrepreneurs on the other hand are independent individuals, again by definition, 
because they want to be their “own bosses”! In fact a great majority of entrepreneurs cannot even 
work within a corporate structure just like a regular employee, an agent. 
And this now takes us to the main topic of this writing as discussed in the following section. 
 
3. A Behavioral Approach to Decision Making in Entrepreneurial Finance 
The approach that we have taken in this article and especially this section is based on the belief 
that if we can better understand the types of risks and uncertainties that are involved in and 
around the entrepreneurial finance problems listed at the beginning of the article, we will have a 
better chance of understanding the related decision processes. Moreover, we also believe that 
such an understanding alone would bring more transparency for all the parties in any given 
transaction, like a financial contract, and consequently, improve their decision processes. 
However the attempt will not end here as we also try to put together “pieces of the risk puzzle” 
and see if a meaningful risk framework can emerge for any future use and analysis.  With these 
in mind, we now continue with such a plan and as follows. 
Perception Asymmetry  
We introduce the Perception Asymmetry as a counterpart to standard finance theory’s 
Information Asymmetry as described in below. But before defining and further discussing the 
proposed imbalance, it would be helpful if we refresh our memory about the Prospect Theory 
and the Affect Heuristic which are discussed in more details in the Appendix. 
                                                           
9
 For a literature review and a related test of the theory see Cai et al (2007). 
10
 For a good discussion and a literature review on Agency Theory and an empirical test of the said theory using data from the VC market, see 
Kaplan and Stromberg, 2002. 
11
 If there is one branch of standard finance that has relevance to the world of entrepreneurs and venture capitalists, it must be the financial 
contracting branch. 
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According to Prospect Theory (PT), there are two distinct phases to each decision- an initial 
phase called Editing or Framing; and a second phase called Evaluation phase. The editing phase 
includes a number of operations that simplify decision problems before they are sent for 
evaluation. Options are evaluated via the Value Function so that a final decision can be made 
regarding the decision problems under consideration.  
According to Affect theory, subjective impressions of "goodness" or "badness" can act as a 
heuristic, capable of producing fast perceptual judgments. For example, stocks perceived as 
"good" are judged to have low risks and high returns and stocks perceived as "bad" are judged to 
have low returns and high risks.  
 
By building upon the Prospect Theory and the Affect heuristic as just mentioned, and using our 
example of entrepreneurs and venture capitalists for illustration, we propose that the perceptions 
of both entrepreneurs and venture capitalists, and consequently their judgments, will be shaped 
by the triple effects of: 
1. The Prospect Theory’s editing operations which include Coding, Combination, 
Segregation, and Cancellation, 
2. The Prospect Theory’s value function where “probability weights” are assigned, and 
3. The Affect heuristic’s capability of producing perceptual judgments. 
In addition to above, the working of the brain would add the fourth effect; but for now we will 
limit our coverage to the key psychological phenomena12. 
We now define Perception Asymmetry as the situation under which a perception gap exists for at 
least one party to a transaction. More specifically, in case of our present discussion, we define 
Perception Asymmetry (PA) as the situation under which a perception gap exists between an 
entrepreneur and a venture capitalist (VC) regarding the same business opportunity, its gain and 
loss potentials, and consequently the opportunity’s perceived value. Furthermore, the only 
situation in which such a gap will not exist is when both the entrepreneur and the VC in question 
share the same psyche; something that is not physically possible. 
We suspect the proposed imbalance would help create a better understanding for both parties 
regarding each other’s views on a transaction like a seed funding deal. Such an understanding 
may minimize the perception asymmetry and consequently bring the parties closer to a mutually 
beneficial decision and possibly conclusion of a deal. 
Resident Risks and Behavioral Risks: Toward a Behavioral Risk Model 
Some behavioral finance scholars, especially Slovic and Olsen, have advocated that risk 
is not “something out there”. By that, they mean risk is not an evidence-based phenomenon like 
                                                           
12
 I am not specifically discussing other heuristics and biases for two main reasons. First, the Prospect Theory and Affect cover most, if not all, of 
such heuristics and biases. Second, given this is a preliminary framework, I’d rather to stay on the central issues to prevent any confusion. For 
detailed discussion of these biases see the Appendix. 
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standard deviation, beta, or other variations thereof that can be measured and used in financial 
decision making13. Put differently, risk does not exist “out there” so that we a) observe it, b) 
measure and analyze it, and c) use it as an input in our Expected-Utility based calculations. 
Slovic (1987) attributes business risk to individual survival risk where he says, “Humans have an 
additional capability that allows them to alter their environment as well as respond to it. This 
capacity both creates and reduces risk”14. He further adds that the “concept risk means different 
things to different people”15. Moreover, affect plays one of the most important roles in the 
perception of risk by individuals. For example if a person has a positive affect regarding a given 
venture, she/he may perceive the risk in that venture much less than the risks perceived by other 
individuals with a lower level of affect for the same exact venture under otherwise the same 
exact circumstances. 
However, and especially from a more applied point of view, we argue that risks and uncertainties 
are not completely perceived “in here” either (in our psyche). This can be seen clearly when we 
break down the notion of total risk and uncertainty into its components and discuss “Resident 
Risks” below. We then believe the truth about the sources of risks probably lie somewhere 
between “out there” and “in here”. To get our discussion started, we define risk and uncertainty 
as follows. 
 
Total (Perceived) Risk and Uncertainty = “Resident Risks” + or – “Behavioral Risks” 
 
Resident Risk: Risk as the “Other Side of a Business Opportunity Coin” 
 
First note that due to the nature of the topic, I use the terms risk and uncertainty interchangeably 
throughout this writing. Second, for simplicity and illustration I use the decision to launch a 
brand new business venture, a business opportunity, as an example.  Now think of “Resident 
Risks” as the type of risks that actually resides in, or are native to, a given business opportunity; 
without which the opportunity would be riskless. (Riskless in the sense of a short-term U.S. 
Treasury Bill.) In other words, in our example, risk is the “other side of a business opportunity 
coin”.  
I especially use the coin analogy to make the point that Resident Risk (RR) automatically comes 
with any selected and implemented business opportunity; just like throwing a coin that comes 
with it known odds of success/fail. Of course, measuring success/failure rates in business are 
much more complicated; but still doable. Another analogy for the definition is water and the 
wetness of water. That is, one cannot exist without the other; and you know if you throw yourself 
in the water, you will get wet, and the odds are 100% in your favor! Just like tossing a coin with 
well defined outcomes, we can also define the possible outcomes in a launch decision. For 
                                                           
13
 Needless to say that the standard finance theory definitions of risk have no relevance at all to a great majority of entrepreneurial finance 
problems where there is little or no historical data “out there” to be measure in the first place! For example, in case of startups almost all the data 
are projected data and are contained in a highly guarded Business Plan. 
14
 Paul Slovic, 1987, p 280. Emphasis is mine. 
15
 Ibid, p 283 
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example, success can mean reaching $10M sales in four years and failure can mean not reaching 
that sales threshold by the fourth year.  
Additionally, dissecting Total Perceived Risk as such has another theoretical and empirical 
advantage. It allows us to have a significant portion of the total risk measurable and concentrate 
on its elusive component- the behavioral risk component.  
Determinants of Resident Risk 
In anticipation of making the resident risk component operational and consequently measurable, 
we can proceed as follows. Imagine yourself as an entrepreneur who has not only found a unique 
business opportunity, but has also developed a non-working prototype of her product and wants 
to launch the business by first perfecting the prototype and then mass producing and selling the 
finished product. She also needs capital to do all the above. You may also imagine yourself at the 
other side of the transaction and as a venture capitalist who is considering funding such an 
entrepreneur. Given this background, we can list and define the following factors as the key 
determinants of residual risk. 
a. Commercialization and Technology risk factor- the risk of taking an opportunity or a 
prototype and turning it into a fully functional product or service that consumers will pay 
to use it,  
b. Market risk factor - whether or not a profitable and sustainable market will emerge for 
the envisioned product/service, 
c. Management risk factor - whether or not the entrepreneur behind the opportunity and her 
team will succeed in executing the envisioned business strategies 
d. Financing risk factor - whether or not the entrepreneur and her team can raise the needed 
capital on a timely basis to execute the envisioned business strategies, and finally, 
e. Macro risk factors- including regulatory risks, environmental risks, etc. 
The above risks certainly exit “out there” in and around any business opportunity. However, they 
do not exist in vacuum as there must be a real asset in the physical world to contain such native 
risks. And that is exactly why I refer collectively to these risks as Resident Risks.16 
Behavioral Risks 
The “Behavioral Risk” component is mainly shaped by the editing, evaluating, and affect 
processes as described earlier in this writing. As shown by the above risk equation, behavioral 
risks can either increase or decrease the total risk. The increase part seems very intuitive by the 
standards of the traditional finance; although that is not the case for the decrease part as it can 
                                                           
16
 Resident Risks can become the only risks, and therefore the only “real” risks, if we take all the heuristics out of the simple equation suggested 
in this section. In such a case, Total Risk is equivalent to the Total Risk under standard finance paradigm, and measurable. But again, to take the 
behavioral risk component out is equivalent to assuming a “mind of God” for a normal earth-bound human being. 
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easily be ignored as a behavioral “anomaly”! To a behavioral economist however, the decrease 
can be attributed to the affect heuristic.  
 Furthermore, according to the proposed risk framework in above and the theories behind it – 
Prospect Theory and Affect Heuristic – the behavioral risk portion of the total risk is our own 
creation. In other words, when we consider a set of opportunities for evaluation and final 
selection, we automatically, and possibly unknowingly, construct a portion of the risks that 
involve all those opportunities. Given the current state of brain technology, this is the type of risk 
that is very hard, if not impossible, to quantify. 
Behavioral Risk Processes 
Although discussion on making the behavioral risk components operational is beyond the present 
writing; however we can still list and describe the four underlying processes that produce it as 
follows. 
a. Framing processes 
b. Evaluation processes 
c. Affective processes, and 
d. Other non-Affect processes like Overconfidence, Availability, Anchoring, etc. 
All the above processes were briefly described in this writing. 
Individual Decision Making in Highly Uncertain Entrepreneurial Settings: A 
Discussion and Two Propositions 
By building upon the Prospect Theory and Affect heuristic, we argued how the editing and 
evaluation phases, coupled with affect’s capability of producing perceptual judgments, can 
influence the perception and judgment of the entrepreneurs and VCs regarding the business 
opportunities that they consider in the course of their businesses. Moreover, by building upon 
Slovic and Olsen’s notion of risk that all risks are perceptual, and introducing the real-life 
aspects of risk and risk taking into the discussion, we proposed a two-component risk formula 
that contained both objective and subjective elements of risk.  
Based on what was said in above, and given my own personal experiences as a real-life 
entrepreneur, investor, and consultant to 100s of entrepreneurs in California, we argue that: 
a. An entrepreneur bases her final decision mainly on the perceived gains and losses of the 
venture opportunity that she has eventually selected as a result of her search for similar 
opportunities, and more importantly, 
b. The finalized and selected business opportunity already has a level of risk and 
uncertainty residing in it that the entrepreneur feels comfortable about. 
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Proposition “a’ is based on the Prospect Theory; and proposition “b” is based on the Affect 
heuristic. 
Moreover, proposition “b” is a simple extension of the two-component risk equation just 
mentioned and discussed in details earlier. Built in proposition “b” is the observation that in the 
real life, business risks automatically come with business opportunities; just like the coin toss 
analogy17.  
4. Summary and Some Suggestions for Future Research 
In this article, we discussed three central decisions in entrepreneurial finance and made the case 
for applying the behavioral finance theories and concepts to better understand such decisions and 
the underlying processes. We also introduced some new concepts such as “Perception 
Asymmetry”, “Resident Risk”, and a preliminary behavioral risk model to further facilitate 
discussions on related risks and uncertainties.  This was done with the belief that if we can better 
understand the issues, we would have a better chance of improving the decision making 
processes. 
Although the discussions in this writing did not lead to a full model, but we certainly hope the 
theory- and experience-based concepts and framework provide a starting point for future 
theoretical and empirical works on the topic. What follows are some suggestions for future 
research relative to the stated problems in this article. 
a.  One immediate and relatively easy-to-implement work is to survey a group of 
entrepreneurs and see if they behave as hypothesized in this writing. My instinct and 
first-hand experiences tell me that they do; however I never conducted a formal study. 
b. The same exact experiment in above can be conducted in case of VCs. Again, my view is 
that VCs also behave as proposed in this article; but this needs to be verified too. 
c. Related to item b in above and as compared with entrepreneurs, I suspect VC’s Total 
Risk is much influenced by the resident risks than the behavioral risks. In other words, 
VCs are expected to be less affective when it comes to investment decisions. On the other 
hand and by definition, entrepreneurs behave the opposite way; i.e., more affectively. 
d. Finally, and this is where the real challenge is, work can be done to make the proposed 
risk model in this chapter operational so that it could be tested for further analysis and 
possible use in decision making. Selection and/or development of a suitable methodology 
that can process both objective and subjective risks and uncertainties is a first major in 
such direction. A possible starting point on methodology is Lewis’ (1980) “The Principal 
Principle”18  
                                                           
17
 Another fact regarding risk taking in real life goes like this, and every honest venture consultant will tell the same to her/his clients: “The only 
way to know the risk is to take the risk!”  
18
 Lewis, David, 1980. “A subjectivist's guide to objective chance”. In: Richard C. JEFFREY, ed. Studies in Inductive Logic and Probability. 
Volume II. Berkeley: University of California Press, Chapter 13, pp. 263-293. I would to thank Martin Sewell for suggesting Lewis’ work. 
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Appendix 
 
A. The Prospect Theory 
 
According to Prospect Theory (PT), there are two distinct phases to each decision- an initial 
phase called Editing or Framing; and a second phase called Evaluation phase. 
1.1.The Editing or Framing Phase. 
According to Kahneman and Tversky (KT), framing effects in decision situations arise when 
different imagery and descriptions of the same problem highlight different aspects of the decision 
outcomes. Choices often depend on the manner in which alternatives are framed (described) and 
presented to us; something not allowed in the Expected Utility (EU) theory. The role of the 
initial editing phase is to organize the possible options for the purpose of simplifying the 
evaluation phase and consequently making it easier to select the final option that has the highest 
value to the decision maker.  
In other words, framing leads to a representation of the acts, outcomes, and contingencies that 
are associated with a particular choice problem like the choice to pursue a specific venture 
opportunity by an entrepreneur. Moreover, often time the entrepreneur does not have the basic 
information about different choices available to her/him; or at least all the available choices are 
not that clear to him.  In such cases she has to actually figure out and possibly mentally construct 
what her options are; a process that is referred to as the Opportunity Recognition phase in the 
traditional entrepreneurship literature and practice19.  
1.2. Editing Operations 
The editing phase also involves the application of a number of operations by the decision maker 
as briefly outlined in below. 
Coding. Coding is simply the categorization of the outcomes in terms of gains and losses; and 
not as final states of wealth which is an underlying assumption used by the EU model. 
Furthermore, gains and losses are defined relative to the status quo or the reference point. Ruling 
out any “psychic income” for entrepreneurs and VCs, the reference point for them corresponds to 
their current assets or their current value of their portfolios.  Moreover, by moving the reference 
point, outcomes may be categorized  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
19
 In a working paper on this topic I argue that by mentally constructing different opportunities and in preparation for the next phase of evaluation 
– where she/he select a specific opportunity for starting a business based on the chosen opportunity – the entrepreneur is effectively, knowingly 
or knowingly, creating the matching risk that she/he will be comfortable with when and if the envisioned venture is actually launched; pending 
the needed financing.  Otherwise, she/he will not take the next steps of actually starting the venture, including starting his search for a financial 
backer. Moreover, such constructed and perceived risk – which is unique to the entrepreneur behind the given opportunity – will be discussed 
along with the real uncertainty that certainly exists in the selected opportunity; the risk that is referred to in the literature as “risk out there”.  For 
the lack of a better term, I refer to this “risk out there” as the “resident risk” or the risk that resides in any new opportunity; as there is no such a 
thing as riskless opportunity. I will also argue that the new term (new as far as I know) is not a tautological argument as it is the next natural step 
in better understanding how at least entrepreneurs make decisions in the real life and how their financiers would have their own perceived risk 
which will be different from the one seen by the entrepreneurs and possibly different from the “resident risk” or  “native risk” . Finally we 
hypothesize that the VC’s envisioned/perceived risk is closer to the real risk- the “resident risk” or  “native risk” -  than that of the entrepreneur. 
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Combination. This refers to the tendency to add together the probabilities of choices that present 
identical outcomes. For example, the prospect (500, .25; 500, .25) is reduced to (500, .50) to 
facilitate evaluation. 
Segregation.  This is where the riskless component of a prospect is separated from its risky 
component.  
Cancellation. This is the tendency to discard common outcome-probability choices. . For 
example, and using KT’s example, the choices (200, 0.2; 100, 0.5; 20, 0.3) and (200, 0.2; 300, 
0.4; -50, 0.4) can be reduced to choices (100, 0.5; 20, 0.3) and (300, 0.4; -50, 0.4). 
1.3.The Evaluation Phase. 
A second phase where acts, related contingencies, and outcomes for each decision choice are 
evaluated. In this phase, the edited prospects, such as business opportunities, are evaluated and 
the business opportunity with the highest value is selected. The Value Function as formulated in 
what follows will be used to assign values to each prospect or opportunity. 
To see this, consider a gamble with two outcomes: x with probability p, and y with 
probability 1 − p; where x ≥ 0 ≥ y. Also assume an initial level of wealth (W) is our reference 
point in this example. According to PT, value of the gamble (or prospect) is 
V = pi (p) v (x) + pi (1 − p) v (y); 
where pi is a probability-weighing function and v is value of an outcome. KT’s value function is 
shown in Figure 2.1 in below.  
Place figure 1 about here 
The value in PT is defined in terms of expected gains and losses and not in terms of 
expected level of final wealth. Furthermore, the probability-weighting function pi (p) is not the 
same thing as original probability p; as can be seen from Figure 2.2 that follows. The probability-
weighting function transforms original probabilities into subject probabilities that follow a non-
linear pattern as shown in Figure 2.2.  
Place figure 2 about here 
B. The Affect Heuristic 
 
According to Finucane, et al, the affect heuristic refers to the way in which subjective 
impressions of "goodness" or "badness" can act as a heuristic, capable of producing fast 
perceptual judgments, and also systematic biases. For example, as Ganzach has demonstrated, 
• Stocks perceived as "good" were judged to have low risks and high return;  
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• Stocks perceived as "bad" were judged to have low return and high risks.  
 
That is, for unfamiliar stocks, perceived risk and perceived return were negatively 
correlated, as predicted by the affect heuristic. For familiar stocks, perceived risk and perceived 
return were positively correlated; riskier stocks were expected to produce higher returns, as 
predicted by ordinary economic theory. 
 
C. Other Heuristics and Biases  
When faced with huge amount of data and information and an array of decision 
problems, people do not do and in fact are not humanly capable of doing the rather complex 
optimization calculations that are expected of them under standard finance theory. Instead, they 
rely on a limited number of cognitive strategies or heuristics that will simplify the complex 
scenarios faced by them in making decisions. We can think of heuristics as information 
processing shortcuts that mainly result from one’s experiences in a field of work. Of course, such 
simplifying shortcuts are productive; until we consider that heuristics, by nature are imperfect, 
and, consequently, will result in biases and errors.  
We furthermore have to add that, in traditional theory, unsystematic biases are expected 
to average out at the market level and consequently have no effect on asset prices. However, the 
behavioralists argue that both heuristics and biases are in fact systematic, thereby potentially 
lasting for long periods of time and affecting prices accordingly.  
Tversky and Kahneman (TK, 1974), as well as other new researchers, have brought to the 
attention of the finance professionals a number of such systematic biases as follows. 
1. Representativeness (Similarity) 
According to TK (TK, 1974), many of the probabilistic questions that people are 
concerned with can be characterized by, “What is the probability that object A belongs to class 
B? What is the probability that event A originates from process B? etc.” To answer questions 
like these, people utilize the representative heuristics, in which probabilities are evaluated by the 
degree to which A resembles B. For example, when A is highly representative of B, the 
probability that A originates form B is judged to be high.  
In such cases the representative heuristic assists in evaluating the probabilities dealing 
with objects or processes A and B. As an example, when A is highly representative of B, the 
probability that A originates from B is judged to be high; and so forth. The problem is that 
representativeness (similarity) should not affect the judgment of probability.  What should be 
considered in the judgment to probability is “prior probability” or “base rate.” However, the 
latter is not the case in practice. (violation of Bayes’ rule). 
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The Representativeness Heuristic in a Nutshell: 
 
• The "representativeness heuristic" is a built-in feature of the brain for producing rapid 
probability judgments, rather than a consciously adopted procedure.  
• As humans we are not aware of substituting judgment of representativeness for judgment 
of probability.  
 
2. Availability 
To understand this judgment heuristic, we just need to know that people 
disproportionately recall the salient events, those that are very recent and/or those that are/were 
emotionally involved with especially in the recent past. The more salient an event is, the more 
likely the probability that we can recall that event. The result is that this sort of bias prevents us 
from considering other potential and related outcomes. For example, one may assess the risk of 
getting mugged in New York City (NYC) by recalling such incidences among friends and 
family. Under availability, people search their memories for relevant information.  
The problem, however, is that not all memories are equally retrievable/available and this 
leads to error in judgment. For example, more recent incidences and more salient events (getting 
mugged in NYC) will weigh more heavily and will lead to prediction biases and distort the 
judgment or estimate.  
The Availability Heuristic in a Nutshell: Biases implicit in the availability heuristic affect 
estimates of risk. 
 
3. Anchoring, Adjustment, and Contamination 
According to TK (1974), when forming estimates and predictions, people usually start 
with some initial arbitrary value and adjust away from it. Also, people make estimates by starting 
from an initial value that is adjusted to yield the final answer. The initial value may be suggested 
by the formulation of the problem or it may be the result of a partial calculation. Regardless, TK 
argue that “adjustments are typically insufficient”,  and “Different starting points yield different 
estimates which are biased toward the initial value”. This is anchoring. Anchoring happens 
when the starting point is given to the subject; as well as when the subject bases her estimate on 
the result of some incomplete computation.  
The Anchoring Heuristic in a Nutshell: 
• Information that is visibly irrelevant still anchors judgments and contaminates guesses. 
When people start from information known to be irrelevant and adjust until they reach a 
plausible-sounding answer, they under-adjust.  
• People under-adjust more severely in cognitively busy situations and other manipulations 
that make the problem harder.  
• People deny they are anchored or contaminated, even when experiment shows they are.  
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• These effects are not diminished or are only slightly diminished by financial incentives, 
explicit instruction to avoid contamination, and real-world situations.  
 
Contamination Effects: 
It turns out that almost any information could work its way into a cognitive judgment. 
(Chapman and Johnson 2002); and you cannot decrease Anchoring or Contamination effects 
either (Tversky and Kahneman 1974) and (Wansink et. al. 1998).  
 
4. Overconfidence Heuristics- and Calibration 
 
People typically have great confidence in judgments based upon them. For example, 
events to which subjects assigned a probability of 2% happened 42.6% of the time! 
5. Hindsight Heuristics 
 
Hindsight bias is when subjects, after learning the eventual outcome, give a much higher 
estimate for the predictability of that outcome than subjects who predict the outcome without 
advance knowledge. Hindsight bias is sometimes called the I-knew-it-all-along effect. Hindsight 
bias is important in legal cases, where a judge or jury must determine whether a defendant was 
legally negligent in failing to foresee a hazard (Sanchiro 2003).  
6. Others- Black Swan Phenomenon 
 
As Taleb has coined the term and discussed this phenomenon is much detail, sometimes 
most of the variance in a process comes from exceptionally rare, exceptionally huge events. 
Consider a financial instrument that earns $10 with 98% probability, but loses $1000 with 2% 
probability; it's a poor net risk, but it looks like a steady winner. As another example, why did 
Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) borrow leverage of $125 billion against $4.72 billion 
of equity, almost ensuring that any Black Swan would destroy them?  
 
Heuristics and Biases: Evidence and Implications- some examples 
• Implication for performance-based management contracts: People/managers will prefer 
performance-based incentives schemes more often than standard theory predicts. This can 
be attributed to the overconfidence trait. Due to overconfidence, managers prefer riskier 
projects because they think they can beat the odds. This goes against the standard theory; 
which predicts that, as output variance increases, principals should offer less output-
sensitive contracts to agents because, under standard theory, agents are assumed to dislike 
risk. According to Camerer and Lovallo (1999) there is some evidence in support of this 
phenomenon. 
• Implication for stock selections due to availability bias: People easily recall the 
information that has recently arrived, especially in the media and corporate releases; and 
their memory is fresh with their broker’s/advisor’s recommendations. According to a 
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study, stocks with very high level of press coverage underperformed in the subsequent 
two years. 
• Implication for asset valuation due to anchoring bias. In a study done in the field of real 
estate, subjects were asked to give their opinions on the appraisal value, appropriate 
listing price, and the lowest price they would accept if they were the seller. This was done 
after they had been given detailed and identical information about the house they had 
been shown for such a purpose. The only information that was changed in this study was 
the asking price (the anchoring factor). The result of this study showed individual 
valuations of houses were directly related to the asking price given to them. 
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Exhibit 1 A Hypothetical Value Function 
Note: The value function is defined by gains and losses on deviations from a reference point, 
where the function is concave for gains and convex for losses. This function is steeper for losses 
than gains (loss aversion). This means a loss causes a greater feeling of pain than a joy caused by 
the same amount of gain. 
 
Source: This figure is reproduced with permission from Martin Sewell and 
behaviuoralfinance.net.  
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Exhibit 2 A Hypothetical Probability Weighting Function for gains (w+) and losses (w-)  
 
Note: According to prospect theory, a probability p has a decision weight w(p). Probability 
weighting functions overweight low probabilities and underweight high probabilities. 
 
Source: This figure is reproduced with permission from Martin Sewell and 
behaviuoralfinance.net.  
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Exhibit 3 Kahneman and Tversky’s Value Function 
Note: This graph illustrates that people are generally risk averse in the gains domain but loss 
averse in the domain of losses. Furthermore, losses cause greater feelings of pain than joys 
caused by the same amount of gain. (Courtesy of Professor Ralph Byrns.) 
 
